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Western-Russian relations are inarguably at their worst of the post-Cold War era. 
The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) remains a key 
international forum for multilateral engagement. Part of the OSCE’s uniqueness is 
its formation around three dimensions of security, which constitute its 
comprehensive security. One of those, the Economic and Environmental (EED), is 
the most overlooked yet, as this paper demonstrates, is the one currently possessing 
greatest capacity for easing some tensions. Through, first, an analysis of the place 
of EED in the OSCE, and thus between the West and Russia, the article establishes 
potentialities for cooperation. It then, however, determines the lack of support, most 
notably among Western governments, rather than post-Soviet, and the place of EED 
activities in post-Soviet states. The article then identifies unexpected but very real 
forms of cooperation in the EED in two protracted post-Soviet conflicts, which can 
establish trust between parties with the potential to expand confidence-building 
further. The article concludes by calling for further use of the EED, in a time when 
                                                             
1 This article developed from invited participation to the collaborative project OSCE Confidence Building in the 
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The Economic and Environmental Dimension (EED) of the Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE) is overlooked, misunderstood or neglected. It should not be any 
of these. Better yet, as is well-known but little operationalised, the OSCE is a world-innovator 
in comprehensive security, being based on the inseparability of the previously 
compartmentalised dimensions of security: the political-military, economic and 
environmental, and human. 
This article seeks not wishfully but substantively to argue for EED’s contribution to 
confidence building mechanisms (CBMs). It does so with reference to conflict and 
cooperation narratives in post-Soviet protracted conflicts and their added capacity to improve 
even Western-Russian relations. The acknowledgement of positive cooperation narratives is 
lacking in the OSCE space in, even when, as this article demonstrates, examples exist.  
Indeed, the EED is meant to have significant potential for CBMs and conflict 
transformation, use of which would be a double-win for the Organization. Calls for the EED 
to serve as confidence-building have long existed.2 By first identifying the place of the EED 
in OSCE thinking, the article first makes the case for the utility and achievability of value-
neutral narratives in the EED and specifically for CBMs. It then assesses how well – or not – 
EED is represented in samples of national Foreign Ministry statements by participating States 
                                                             
2 Academic literature on the OSCE EED, let alone on its actual relation to CBMs, is necessarily slender and the 
present contribution intends to show existing connections that have emerged recently through initiatives in 
conflicts.For an overview dated from the late 1990s, see Rob Zaagman, ‘OSCE Conflict Prevention and the 
Economic and Environmental Dimension’, Helsinki Monitor Vol. 10, No. 4 (1999), pp. 40-48. An insightful policy 
study, although tellingly dated from as far back as 2002, remains Frank Evers, Building Co-operation between 
OSCE Field Missions and Partner Institutions in the Economic and Environmental Dimension (Hamburg: Institute 
for Peace Research and Security  Policy  at the University  of Hamburg CORE Working Paper 11, 2002). 
 3 
(pSs),3 and then in the mandates of OSCE field missions. That exercise reveals the uneven 
reference to EED per se, let alone to its CBM capacities, which calls for better commitment 
by Western and post-2004 EU member-states, while giving opportunity for the commitments 
by post-Soviet states to be harnessed. The article then identifies areas of actual and potential 
(further) cooperation in the EED domain across borders and in conflict zones, from the 
Transnistria-Moldovan and Abkhaz-Georgian conflicts. Because the contention of the article 
is that actual cases of confidence-building from the EED and the potential for more is 
overlooked, additional research was undertaken by interviewing office-holders inside the 
OSCE and engaging with it from other IOs, including the European External Action Service. 
The conclusion offers both analytical and policy suggestions for the EED in conflict 
narratives in the fraught space that is the OSCE. 
 
The Promotion of CBMs in the OSCE’s EED 
The OSCE’s now-57 pSs have agreed through their initial signing of the Helsinki Final Act 
(HFA) of 1975, and those values’ reiteration in Summit Declarations at Paris in 1990, Istanbul 
in 1999 and Astana in 2010, that the OSCE is a security community built on shared values. 
They benefit from gains in the First, Political-Military, Dimension with such current priorities 
as anti-terrorism, and anti-radicalisation, and more traditional activities, such as weapons 
destruction.4 At the same time, they are committed to upholding a very broad, common set of 
minority and human rights and democratisation principles, known as the Third or Human 
Dimension (HD). That generated some of the Organization’s greatest internal strife, when 
starting in 2003 post-Soviet states came to see the HD as a mechanism to foment domestic 
                                                             
3 Due to the OSCE operating on the basis of political commitments from states rather than from legal agreements, 
States participate rather than belong, giving rise to the somewhat clumsy abbreviation of participating States (pSs). 
4 The Russian Federation’s withdrawal in 2007 from the Conventions Force in Europe Treaty of 1990 weakened 
the role of the Political-Military Dimension. In 2015 Moscow also withdrew from meetings of the Treaty’s Joint 
Consultative Group, its last connection to this important component of the first dimension. 
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unrest. The EED as the Second Dimension, with much potential for apolitical, functional win-
win activities, is either neglected or suffers from tensions in the First or Third. This is even 
when a leading analyst wrote in 2002 that the OSCE’s ‘EED has established itself as an 
integral part of a now institutionalized organization’ and that that Dimension’s own  
institutionalization has been ‘basically completed’.5 
The Hamburg Ministerial Council (MC) Declaration of 2016 highlighted existing capacities 
in the EED, and gave new impetus to ‘connectivity’ that would bolster key aspects of the 
Dimension ‘through transport and trade facilitation, including through measures at different 
levels of government, can enhance economic co-operation that is mutually beneficial and 
contribute to good-neighbourly relations, confidence-building and trust in the OSCE area.’6 
The ‘connectivity’ of 2016 is by definition novel, and therefore untested, and deserving of 
some scepticism. An EU official with responsibilities for engagement with the OSCE noted in 
2017 how little connectivity existed in the Second Dimension, even suggesting that it was 
more applicable to the Military-Political Dimension.7 
Additionally, when recognising the EED’s potential, including for confidence 
building, observers note that many other, better-financed institutions crowd out the OSCE.8 In 
the climate of high tensions between Russia and the West, the OSCE’s own objective of 
‘connectivity’ among pSs and between its dimensions, or put differently, through its 
comprehensive approach, makes the EED more important.  
                                                             
5 Evers, Building Co-operation, p. 8 and p, 10. 
6 Decision No. 4/16 ‘Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity’, 9 December 2016, available 
at: http://www.osce.org/cio/289316?download=true. 
7 Telephone interview with EU official, Brussels, 26 June 2017. 
8 ‘…given the many specialized international – and to some extent financially powerful – organizations and 
institutions or “clubs” that are active in these areas, the role which the OSCE should play in the economic and 
environmental dimension remains unclear.’ Kurt P. Tudyka, ‘Whither the Second Basket? Evolution of the 
Economic and Environmental Dimension of the OSCE’, Security Community (Issue 2/2015).  
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The EU considers the ‘connectivity’ of the OSCE CiO Decision in Hamburg to 
include the development of infrastructure in the post-Soviet space, and that doing so is 
apolitical. However, trade remains subject to geopolitical discussion, and thus evidently is far 
more sensitive.9 Indeed, the EU’s Eastern Partnership and the intention of creating trade 
regimes with all six countries has become intensively politicised and which Moscow sees as a 
challenge to its Eurasian Economic Union. Trade relations of course have become 
fundamentally political after EU and US (and other countries’) sanctions and embargoes 
against Russian financial and energy interests in response to the 2014 annexation of Crimea, 
and then diplomatic expulsions for the apparent Russian use of a nerve agent in Salisbury, 
England. That the UK did not seek EU sanctions against Russia at a March 2018 EU summit 
consequently left Western-Russian economic relations unaffected, despite the ensuing 
diplomatic expulsions. 
Western-Russian cooperation – such as for safe destruction of nuclear waste – has 
been funded by other organizations. The EBRD gave €165 million to remove, ship and 
destroy Soviet/Russian naval nuclear waste from Andreyeva Bay.10 In a bi-national level, the 
Russian government accepted British assistance to raise the sunken Russian submarine The 
Kursk.11 That was, of course, back in 2010. 
 By contrast, the German Chairman-in-Office (CiO) of 2016 convened a 1000-person 
conference in Berlin, which German Foreign Minister and OSCE CiO Franz-Walter 
Steinmeier explained was 
to engage in an experiment: an experiment because we want to talk about political 
visions at a time of severe political discord, an experiment because we want to 
                                                             
9 Based on a telephone interview with the EEAS, 26 June 2017. 
10 Keith Perry, ‘First shipment of spent nuclear fuel leaves Andreeva Bay’, EBRD, 27 June 2007, available at: 
http://www.ebrd.com/news/2017/first-shipment-of-spent-nuclear-fuel-leaves-andreeva-bay.html 
11 ‘Stranded sub: Russians accept British offer of help’, The Guardian [online], 16 Aug 2000, available at: 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/aug/16/russia.kursk1. 
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talk about concrete co-operation at a time when violent conflicts in our common 
area are claiming lives almost every day, and an experiment because we want to 
talk about trade and business at a time when many people believe that our vision 
of a common area of security and stability will never come to pass.12 
 EED sectoral projects, such as transboundary water cooperation, river commission 
management and waste management are core projects, but they lack wider support because of 
other on-ground specialist organizations, such as the UN Development Programme, which 
implement such initiatives. Although the OSCE promotes EED projects publicly (on websites, 
at meetings), economic cooperation remains often as abstract discussions about projects. As a 
result, sectoral projects, including those such as border monitoring missions, remain about 80 
percent financed by extra-budgetary contributions, that is, by additional voluntary 
contributions from pSs.13 Such funding, particularly in HD activities, provoked post-Soviet 
claims of political conditionality, or even of regime change, and funding for connectivity 
needs to cautious to avoid the same charges. The EED’s apolitical, functional starting point 
should give cooperation better chances.  
These practices present two implications for the EED: first, certain pSs especially and 
perhaps unexpectedly, Western governments, as the article later determines, downplay the 
added value and in some cases even the existence of the EED. Such oversight limits from the 
outset the EED’s potential, and then its potential capacity for enhancing trust in the other two 
dimensions. Indeed, various OSCE officials charged with EED remind the pSs of precisely 
that.14 Second, the OSCE’s presence in field offices allows engagement with local 
                                                             
12 Cited in Ursula Froese, ‘An OSCE Experiment in Connectivity’, Security Community No. 2 (2016), p. 4. 
13 Based on an interview with the EU Delegation to the International Organisations in Vienna, 1 July 2017. 
14 The publication of OSCE Economic and Environmental Dimension Commitments Reference Manual 2017 
(Vienna: Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, 2017), and at 358 pages, 
speaks to that. 
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communities.15 Through increased cooperation with other IOs and NGOs on the ground they 
act as force multipliers. Indeed, the OSCE seeks to cooperate with other actors to these 
positive and efficient ends.  
 Securing consensus on how to promote and deploy the EED remains the essential 
starting point towards guaranteeing its successful usage and implementation. The article 
consequently seeks to determine how well the EED is understood and (not) promoted within 
the OSCE system by pSs themselves, and in field missions, and identifies areas of such 
cooperation in the most difficult of geopolitical circumstances, which could be expanded 
further.16 Of additional note is that the EU generally strongly supports OSCE initiatives, and 
the signing of Association Agreements (AAs) and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreements (DCFTAs) with Georgia and Moldova (and Ukraine) provides additional potent 
incentivisation for conflict transformation, as will be discussed. 
 
The Ideals and Realities of the OSCE’s EED  
Although the EED has been neglected in policy and in academic study, the OSCE has 
nevetheless gained expertise in tt dimension and has undertaken projects in practice that have 
given the Organization distinction from other actors.17  Some of this is detailed elsewhere and 
it is worth noting sone inttiaitbve in the past to intensify EED activities in the post-Soviet 
space. One such was the effort of the Dutch CiO in 2003 to transfer funds from OSCE-
intensive activities in the Balklans to Central Asia, specigficaly in the EED.18 
                                                             
15 An interview conducted for the present study with the EU Delegation noted the positive societal responses to 
OSCE outreach. Brussels, 1 July 2017. 
16 A recent analysis and also normative call for coordination among the OSCE and other IOs an IFIs is in Rick 
Fawn, International Organizations and Internal Conditionality: Making Norms Matters (London: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013). Synergies between the EU, especially its Association Agreements, and the OSCE are also 
addressed in the article’s conclusion. 
17 We are grateful for the insights and encouragement of one of the anonymous referees on this point. 
18 A. Nitzsche,  ‘Fresh Funding Boosts Economic – Environmental Work in Central Asia’, 
OSCE Newsletter 10: 3 (April 2003), pp. 7-9, cited in Alexander Warkotsch, ‘The OSCE as an agent of 
socialisation? International norm Dynamics and political change in Central Asia’, Europe-Asia Studies, 59:5 
(2007), pp. 832. 
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 A recent starting point of OSCE efforts to make the EED a strong(er) pillar are visible 
in the aforementioned Decision 4/16 of the Hamburg Ministerial Council of December 2016: 
‘Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity’. The importance of trade and 
transport facilitation is, however, deeply anchored in previous documents and the centrality of 
it has been recognised early on. The EED already benefits from structured, formalised 
interactions. The annual Economic and Environmental Forum convened annually in 
September in Prague, is preceded by a Preparatory Meeting, organized at the OSCE 
heaquarters in Vienna, and then at least a second one, held in the capital of the country 
holding the OSCE Chairmanship. 19 The 26th EEF concluded that ‘Co-operation on economic 
and environmental topics contributed to confidence-building, strengthening stability and 
improving living conditions in conflict regions, although it provided no details.20 Providing 
them, and especially from conflict regions in the OSCE space, is intended as one of the 
article’s contributions. The HFA of 1975 already then provided ground to encourge 
developments in the EED. Indeed, as a recent commentary noted‚ the HFA gave ‘commercial 
exchange ... a prominent place already‘.21 The Hamburg MC resulting in all pSs agreeing a 
statement that observed the EED’s substantial history and also reaffirming commitment to 
earlier statements.22 The EEF is one of the several means by which war-torn Afghanistan, an 
OSCE partner (but not participating) State is integrated into the Organization’s activities.23 
                                                             
19 See ‘Economic and Environmental Forum’, at: http://www.osce.org/secretariat/eeforum. 
20 25th economic and Environmental Forum, Greening the Economy and Building Partnerships for Security in 
the OSCE Region, Concluding Meeting, 6-8 September 2017, Consolidated Summary, p. 6, available at: 
https://www.osce.org/secretariat/369581?download=true. 
21 Cited in Froese, ‘OSCE Experiment’, p. 4. 
22 ‘Decision No. 4/16, Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity’, 
MC.DEC/4/16, 9 December 2016. The Ministerial-Council decision made reference to the 
Document of the Bonn Conference on Economic Co-operation in Europe adopted in 1990, the 
OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension adopted in Maastricht 
in 2003, the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept adopted in Ljubljana in 2005, 
Ministerial Council Decision No. 11/06 on future transport dialogue in the OSCE adopted in 
Brussels in 2006, Ministerial Council Decision No. 11/11 on strengthening transport dialogue in 
the OSCE adopted in Vilnius in 2011. 
23 See more broadly Alice Ackermann, ‘The OSCE and transnational security challenges’, Security and Human 
Rights no. 3 (2009), p. 240. 
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Recent interviews with EU officials expressed hope for the prospects of ‘connectivity’ 
in Central Asia, given the relatively low degree of intra- and inter-conflict, and the need to 
increase trade connections and transport routes given Soviet-era centralisation of 
infrastructure towards the Russian core.24 That legacy and the fact of unresolved conflicts in 
the post-Soviet space present enormous challenges for the OSCE’s connectivity.25 Yet, the 
OSCE addresses this challenge, as the OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building 
Measures (CBMs) indicates: 
the EED – because of its intrinsic functionalist dimensions – offers great potential, 
but remains highly neglected. The principle and potential of EED – including 
specifically as confidence-building – is firmly established in OSCE thinking.  
The Guide continues that ‘Economic CBMs can bind States and communities together 
through economic co-operation and thereby remove barriers of mistrust …. Issues in the 
environmental field can have the advantage of being seen as non-sensitive and thus politically 
safe’.26 
The following section analyses how the EED is promoted, and not, by pSs and in field 
mission mandates. Thereafter, the article establishes linkage between the EED and post-
Soviet protracted conflicts to demonstrate the EED’s potential in some of the most difficult 
situations in the OSCE area and between the West and Russia. Before doing so, it is beneficial 
to note cases where the EED, or initiatives related to it, have occurred in the post-Soviet 
space. 
                                                             
24 The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies, Trade Integration in the CIS: Alternate Options, 
Economic Effects and Policy Implications for Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia and Ukraine, (Vienna, 2012), 
available at: https://wiiw.ac.at/trade-integration-in-the-cis-alternate-options-economic-effects-and-policy-
implications-for-belarus-kazakhstan-russia-and-ukraine-pj-33.html. 
25 Based on an interview with the EEAS, 26 June 2017. 
26 OSCE Guide on Non-military Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) (Vienna: 2010), pp. 9-10. 
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 This occasionally happens, if selectively and geographically-specifically. A Report for 
the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment of the 
OSCE Parliamentary Assembly asserted: Energy and the environment are closely interlinked, 
as is clear from a series of actions that the OSCE is pursuing in regions like Siberia and 
Central Asia, in part as a way of preventing conflicts.  
Additionally, the report observers, 
Transnational water basins are the most significant sphere in which this new 
form of co-operation is unfolding. The OSCE area’s most important water 
basins span the territories of multiple States. The OSCE has consequently 
started up major cross-border co-operation programmes to manage water 
networks in Central Asia and Siberia, oriented above all towards prevention 
and environmental risk management through early warning systems.  
The Report further observes: 
 OSCE co-operation is being undertaken to avoid irreparable disasters 
such as the ones that befell the Caspian and Aral Seas to protect Lake 
Baikal and its complex hydrological and environmental system.27 
 
These initiatives are among post-Soviet states, rather than more widely in the OSCE space, 
but the principle and the precedent auspiciously remain. The proceedings of the OSCE’s 24th 
                                                             
27 Report for the General Committee on Economic Affairs, Science, Technology and Environment of the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, Enhancing Mutual Trust and Co-operation for Peace and Prosperity in the OSCE 
Region, 5-9 July 2016, available at: 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0BwODhbFzbrEYaGJWWlhEck41UWc/view.  
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EEF repeatedly call for the EED to ‘be used as a catalyst for cooperation and confidence 
building while including the activities of the field operations’.28  
Even so, individual pSs – that is, both their Foreign Ministry and OSCE Permanent 
Delegation sites – say very little of the EED. We look at a sample in turn, with an eye to 
getting EED itself, and then its CBM potential, deeper into the OSCE discourse. In other 
words, the legitimately positive narrative should be publicised and then use to encourage 
further initiatives. That, however, requires the full and proactive commitment of pSs. 
 
How do participating States present and prioritise the EED? 
A sampling of pS websites suggests that the EED earns very limited attention, quite apart 
from its CBM potential also being recognised. The assessment was conducted by dividing the 
pSs into three groups: Western established democracies; newer democracies in the EU and 
NATO; and post-Soviet states. The logic is to detect divergent approaches to the EED, and 
how language and rhetorical commitment could help to bridge political divides. Many pSs in 
each category do not have separate websites for their permanent delegation to the OSCE or on 
their MFA sites, but a sample of at least three countries from each category offers indicative 
trends. 
 
Western established democracies  
                                                             
28 Office of the Coordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, 24th Economic and 
Environmental Forum: Strengthening stability and security through co-operation on good governance (Vienna, 
2016), p. 11. 
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 In a rather brief lead page, US State Department declares that the OSCE (still referring to as 
having 56 pSs) is ‘encouraging open and transparent economies’.29 However, a further search 
finds rather positive elaboration about the EED:  
The United States will remain an active participant in this continuing 
conversation, one that includes civil society, academic experts, government 
officials, and business representatives, to discuss opportunities to strengthen 
security and good governance through a greener economy and stronger 
partnerships.30 
 
This type of support could and should be made more prominent, and be reiterated by other 
Western pSs. Regarding the EED, the United Kingdom’s Foreign Office site referred, by 
contrast, only to the CSCE’s Paris Charter – from a 1990 – for having ‘recorded a 
commitment to economic liberty and free market economics.’31 The UK’s Permanent 
Delegation to the OSCE gives substantive paragraphs to the Political-Military and the Human 
Dimensions. The EED, however, receives the solitary descriptive sentence: ‘The OSCE also 
covers a range of economic and environmental issues.’32 
Canada, calling itself a leading supporter of the OSCE, nevertheless mentions only 
‘sustainable development’.33 That is more than another human-security promoting power such 
as Norway, which writes that the OSCE ‘offers a forum for political negotiations and 
                                                             
29 ‘OSCE’, https://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/osce/, first accessed 28 June 2017; still as at 8 June 2018. 
30 https://osce.usmission.gov/closing-session-second-preparatory-meeting-25th-osce-economic-environmental-
forum-astana-kazakhstan/, last accessed 28 June 2017. 
31 [UK] Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Research Analysts Note, ‘What is the OSCE? The CSCE and OSCE 
from 1975 to 2014’, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/479115/RA_Newsletter_Nov_201
5_The_CSCE_and_the_OSCE_1975-2014.pdf. 
32 The UK Delegation to the OSCE, https://www.gov.uk/world/organisations/organization-for-security-and-co-
operation-in-europe, first accessed 3 July 2017 and the same at 25 April 2018. 




decision-making in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and 
post-conflict rehabilitation, and puts the political will of its participating states into practice 
through its network of field missions.’ Nothing of the EED is implied.34 Ireland’s ‘priorities at 
the OSCE coincide with those of the EU. In addition it attaches significant weight to 
strengthening and safeguarding the work of the OSCE in the Human Dimension. EED is 
similarly absent, or at best implicitly mentioned.35 Having taken ‘Western’ examples, how do 
a sample number of post-communist EU member-states and then post-Soviet states treat the 
EED? 
 
Post-communist EU and NATO member-states  
Post-communist states that entered NATO and the EU from 1999 onwards tend to be highly 
supportive of the OSCE not only because of its inclusive membership but also because of the 
support that the HFA gave to its communist-era dissidents. Even so, among this group 
declaratory support for the EED is modest. The Czech Republic offers no specific examples 
but appropriately equates all three dimensions and also calls for their equal respect: 
The Czech Republic actively supports the work of the OSCE within its 
comprehensive security concept throughout all three dimensions: the politico-
military, the economic and environmental and the human dimension [and] 
encourages the fulfilment of respective commitments in these dimensions by all 
OSCE participating States.36 
                                                             
34 ‘About the OSCE’, https://www.norway.no/en/missions/osce/norway-and-the-osce/about-the-osce/, last 
accessed 25 April 2018. 
35 ‘Ireland’s priorities at the OSCE and the Mission’s role’, https://www.dfa.ie/osce/ireland-at-the-osce/ireland-
at-the-osce/, last accessed 25 April 2018. 
36 ‘The Czech Republic in the OSCE’, available at: 
http://www.mzv.cz/mission.vienna/en/organisations_covered_by_the_permanent/osce/czech_republic_in_the_os
ce/index.html, last accessed 29 June 2017. 
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Poland places itself among ‘the most active participants of the dialogue in the OSCE.’ 
However, unlike the Czech Republic, it makes no reference to the dimensions, let alone 
encouragement for the EED. Rather, it refers only to political-military functions, calling the 
Organisation ‘a forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early 
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation’.37 Romania 
similarly ignores the EED, while giving detailed attention to the political-military. Its 
Permanent Mission ‘advances the Romanian foreign policy objectives of preventing conflict, 
promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law in the OSCE area [and] encourages 
open and transparent political, social and media reforms’. It then mentions roles regarding the 
CFE and Open Skies Treaty, all first dimension matters.38 The omission is perhaps 
particularly curious considering that Romania’s 2001 CiO gave accent to the EED, and 
specifically also as a means of conflict prevention.39  
Although Central European states remain supporters of the OSCE, some post-Soviet 
states demonstrate far greater commitment to and use of the EED. That irony should be useful 
for the OSCE and for CBMs. 
 
Post-Soviet states 
Where established and newer democracies ignore or minimise the EED, several post-Soviet 
governments afford it positive attention. Belarus, takes some credit for advancing the EED, 
                                                             
37 ‘Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe’, available at: 
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/security_policy/osce/, first accessed 29 June 2017, and same as of 8 
June 2018. 
38 ‘The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’, http://mpviena.mae.ro/en/node/683, last accessed 
25 April 2018. 
39 For example: ‘Our demarche has been a search for rendering the OSCE EED activities more 
effective, with a view to strengthening the Organization’s early warning and conflict 
prevention capacity.’, Address by Mr. Daniel Daianu, National Coordinator for the Economic and 
Environmental Dimension of the OSCE Romania / OSCE Chairmanship-in-Office UNECE/OSCE International 
Conference “The Role of the Economic Dimension in Conflict Prevention in Europe” OSCE CiO/Romania, 
available at: https://www.osce.org/eea/42080?download=true, [unpaginated but at p. 10 ]. 
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pronouncing that its representation saw through the drafting and adoption at the 2003 Dutch 
MC steered the OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension. It 
also notes that the ‘Permanent Representative of Belarus to the OSCE acted as Coordinator 
for the Corfu debates [of 2009-10] on economic and environmental security challenges.’40 
Such statements do not prove a country to be an OSCE enthusiast, but they give some 
relatively significant prominence to the EED and a means thereby to encourage more. 
 Armenia offers a matter-of-fact statement of equality of the three dimensions, 
explaining that the OSCE provides ‘comprehensive approaches to security which [sic] issues 
ranging from the politico-military and economic-environmental aspects to the human 
dimension.’41 The Economic-Environmental remains present. Ukraine went further, noting of 
its ‘successful Chairmanship’ of the OSCE in 2013, including that it ‘managed to ensure the 
consensus among 57 participating States on … enhancing OSCE efforts in energy and 
environment’.42  
 Post-Soviet states, criticised in the OSCE for non-observance of HD commitments, 
might support the EED as a surrogate for other OSCE commitments. That remains 
advantageous for the OSCE, as this article later argues; such commitment locks the post-
Soviet pSs into the OSCE system. The observation here of the divergent support for the EED 
among pSs is also a call for established democracies to do better. How OSCE Field Missions 
deal with the EED is another relevant dimension for considering its potential. 
 
How do OSCE Field Mission Mandates Address the EED?  
                                                             
40 ‘Cooperation with the OSCE’, available at: http://austria.mfa.gov.by/en/osce/cooperation/, last accessed 29 
June 2017. 
41 ‘Armenia – OSCE’, available at: http://osce.mfa.am/en/bilateral/, last accessed 27 June 2017. 
42 ‘Ukraine and International Organisations / Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe / About 
OSCE’, at http://vienna.mfa.gov.ua/en/ukraine-io/osce/about, last accessed 27 April 2018. 
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Assessing Field Mission (FM) attention to the EED is difficult because of the pressure by 
several pSs to sheer mandates of the HD or even to close missions, due to their presence being 
seen as ‘stigmas’.43 Even Latvia and Estonia viewed OSCE presences similarly, and had FMs 
closed in 2001, in advance of the conclusion of their EU accession negotiations. The OSCE 
Project Co-ordinator in Baku, Azerbaijan, was terminated, and with but a single month’s 
notice, at the end of 2015, itself already a presence downgraded from that of an Office since 
2014. Even the few, and relatively-speaking, ‘liberal’ post-Soviet states have sought FM 
mandates to be downgraded. Kyrgyzstan, which had received an expanded mandate, staffing 
and budget increase by international consensus following the country’s political and ethnic 
upheavals in 2010. Though seemingly friendly to the OSCE, Kyrgyzstan then succeeded in 
having its OSCE presence demoted to a Programme Office, and had terminated the field 
office in the south of country. Nevertheless, the OSCE’s presence Kyrgyzstan retains a very 
substantial, multifaceted EED, while its activities in the HD have been reduced. 
Brief content analysis conducted for this article of the Vienna-based OSCE Conflict 
Prevention Centre’s February 2016 Survey of OSCE Field Operations generated (excluding 
context-irrelevant usages) these tasks: 
Human rights    27 
Economic     19 
environmental   19 
media (freedom of, reporting on) 12 
elections    7 
                                                             
43 Frank Evers, ‘OSCE field activities: verbal encouragement, factual cutback’, Security and Human Rights, Vol. 




The frequency of the EED, based on this content count, falls well below one Human 
Dimension indicator, human rights promotion, but significantly above two others, media and 
elections. The EED therefore, in terms of prominence in OSCE Field mandates, ranks 
significantly. 
And where Human Dimension activities have been attacked by post-Soviet government  very 
positive comments are found regarding the EED. Thus the Russian Permanent Representative 
to the OSCE declared supportively of the Organization’s Project Coordination Office in 
Uzbekistan: 
The Co-ordinator’s efforts in the economic and environmental dimension with a view 
to developing national mechanisms to assess the risk of money laundering and the 
financing of terrorism, promoting a ‘green’ economy and assisting the Uzbek 
Government in combating corruption are worthy of acknowledgement.44 
Positive endorsements of EED activities from post-Soviet pSs may be distractions from the 
HD. But here the fight against terrorism, which has enjoyed consensus among pSs, is linked 
directly to the EED, such as collaborative efforts to track and stop illegal economic activities 
that finance terrorism.  
All this suggests that more practical engagement between the Organisation and pSs 
and across the East-West political divide could be attempted. In geographic areas ripe for 
cross-border EED initiatives, many rest at the level of seminars rather than action. By that is 
meant the perception that the OSCE manages to convene multiple in-country expert meetings 
                                                             
44 ‘Statement by Alexander Lukashevich, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation, at the 1149th 
meeting of the OSCE Permanent Council. In response to the report by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in 




and training sessions, while being unable to address matters of practical substance. Thus the 
Organization could announce that its Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine delivered, in 
conjunction with the OSCE Office for Economic and Environmental Activities, ‘a joint 
training workshop on radiological control and prevention of environmental crimes for 
environmental inspectors, border guards and customs officers’ A promising development, but 
that was one conducted in 2013.45  
Unlike pSs, which can decide how much or little they emphasise the EED, the FM 
mandates are agreed between the host country and the Organisation, and that in turn is a result 
of consensus. EED activities have been and largely remain a significant part of those remits, 
and often with a transboundary or even regional dimension, EED actuality and potential in 
field mission mandates can be mobilised further. 
Better still, EED initiatives could be harnessed to improve fractious relations among 
pSs by making positive narratives of cooperation. The article turns next to how that can and is 
being done, and regarding some of the most contentious and intractable issues in the OSCE 
space: in post-Soviet conflict zones. The article suggests that if real results from the EED and 
as a confidence-building are possible in these worst-case scenarios, then prospects may be for 
more positive narratives between East and West.  
 
Narratives of post-Soviet Conflicts and the OSCE’s EED 
The link between post-Soviet conflicts and IOs has been that the latter received a mandate to 
address them through improving the living standards of the population and introducing some 
sort of understanding, including apologies (in the ideal case) between the conflict parties. 
Competing, usually exclusivist, narratives exist on each conflict side. Narratives are 
                                                             
45 ‘Enhancing environmental border protection in Ukraine’, 15 November 2013, available at: 
http://www.osce.org/ukraine/108422. 
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understood here as ‘compelling storylines which can explain events convincingly and from 
which inferences can be drawn’.46 This approach assumes that the intractability of conflict 
itself is often deeply rooted in the ‘stories that people use to understand and describe aspects 
of their lives’.47 However, narratives can easily be misused and manipulated – even in 
favourable circumstance the range of narratives is limited.  
These narratives are usually rooted in the divergent perceptions of the sources of 
conflict. They have contributed to the low point of trust between Russia and the West. 
Positive examples arising from the use of the EED, however, could ease some of this distrust 
and help rebuild trust through apolitical, functional cooperation. CBMs are most useful for 
bringing conflict parties together for discussing CBMs in different areas, as cooperation in 
ecology, law enforcement and human rights. Because of the focus on the conflict dimension 
of post-Soviet conflicts, as even some OSCE officials privately feel, CBMs have received 
unduly little attention.48 That is a lost opportunity. And that may be additionally so, in view of 
the EU’s conclusion of the AAs and DCFTAs with Georgia and Moldova (and Ukraine). The 
Agreements with Moldova and Georgia make specific reference to conflict resolution 
(whereas the counterpart agreements with Ukraine do not.49 That absence should signal 
already the marked difference in EU expectation for the conflicts in Georgia and Moldova, to 
which the article returns. 
 The article turns to two post-Soviet conflicts that have not only affected relations 
within the former Soviet space but also wider Western-Russian, and in which the different 
degrees of capacity of the EED in both local and wider conflict transformation will be 
identified. 
                                                             
46 Lawrence Freedman, The Transformation of Strategic Affairs, Adelphi Papers 379 (London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006), p. 22. 
47 Colin Robson, Real World Research 3rd edition (Oxford: Wiley, 2011), p. 374. 
48 Telephone interview with OSCE official, 5 July 2017. 
49 See analysis in for example, European Parliamentary Research Service, Association agreements between 
the EU and Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine: European Implementation Assessment (June 2018), p. 19. 
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Inter-state potential: Moldova, Ukraine and the OSCE’s EED CBMs in the Transnistrian 
conflict50   
 
The breakaway region of Transnistria, or the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) has 
been outside the control of the Soviet successor state of Moldova after fighting in 1992. The 
conflict has seen various peace efforts51 but remains unresolved.52 
 This conflict, however, does not have a pronounced ethno-linguistic dimension, even 
if the population of a half-million in PMR are predominantly Slavophones who look to 
Moscow rather than to Moldavan/Romanian-speaking Chisinau as their geocultural anchor.53 
Both parties have established trade arrangements, including with neighbouring countries. 
Although these may be in the grey economy, they nevertheless represent cooperation.54 The 
OSCE has officially brought together various civil society groups for management of their 
                                                             
50 For the purpose of impartiality, the term Transnistria is used. The OSCE, however, employs Transdnistria, a 
‘compromise’ term, also to show neutrality; Dniester is the Russian terminology and appears less frequently in 
international journals than the Romanian spelling. 
51 Ryan Kennedy, ‘The Limits of Soft Balancing: The Frozen Conflict in Transnistria and the Challenge to the 
EU and NATO Strategy’, Journal of Small Wars & Insurgencies, 27:3, (2016), 512-37; Claus Neukirch, 
‘Moldovan Headaches The Republic of Moldova 120 days after the 2001 Parliamentary Elections’, Working 
Paper #3, CORE, (Hamburg: IFSH, 2001) and ‘National Minorities in the Republic of Moldova - Some Lessons 
Learned, Some Not?’ Journal for Labour and Social Affairs in Eastern Europe, 2:3 (1999), pp. 45-63; 
John O'Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Andrei Tchepalyga, ‘National Construction, Territorial Separatism, 
and Post-Soviet Geopolitics in the Transdniester Moldovan Republic’, Post-Soviet Geography and Economics, 
38 (1998), 332-58; Oleh Protsyk, ‘Moldova’s Dilemmas in Democratizing and Reintegrating Transnistria’, 
Problems of Post-Communism, 53:4 (July/August 2006), pp. 29-41; Stefan Troebst ‘Moldovan Transnistrian 
Republic: From Conflict Driven State-Building to State Driven Nation-Building’, European Yearbook for 
Minority Issues (ECMI, 2002/03); Andrew Williams, ‘Conflict Resolution after the Cold War: The Case of 
Moldova’, Review of International Studies, 25:1 (January 1999), 71-96; Gottfried Hanne, ‘The Role And 
Activities of the OSCE Mission to Moldova In The Process Of Transdniestrian Conflict Resolution’, in 
European Yearbook of Minority Issues, #3 ECMI, (2002); ICG, Moldova: No Quick Fix, #147 (12 August 2003); 
and ICG, Moldova’s Uncertain Future, #175 (17 August 2006). 
52 Considerable literature exists on the conflict and on negotiating efforts, such as Stanislav Secrieru, ‘The 
Transnistrian conflict: new opportunities and old obstacles for trust building (2009–2010)’, Southeast European 
and Black Sea Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2011), pp. 241-63.  
53 Similarly, relatively considerable literature is available on the impact of the conflict on both Transnistria’a and 
Moldova’s manoeuvring between the West and Russia, see Cristian Cantir and Ryan Kennedy, ‘Balancing on the 
Shoulders of Giants: Moldova's Foreign Policy toward Russia and the European Union’, Foreign Policy Analysis 
Vol. 11, No. 4 (October 2015), pp. 397–416; and Igor Istomin and Irina Bolgova, ‘Transnistrian strategy in the 
context of Russian–Ukrainian relations: the rise and failure of “dual alignment”’, Southeast European and Black 
Sea Studies Vol. 16, No. 1 (2016), pp. 169-94. 
54 See more broadly, Charles King, ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War: Understanding Eurasia's Unrecognized States’, 
World Politics Vol. 53, No. 4 (July 2001), pp. 524-52.  
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common ecosystem, localised issues results from climate change.55 The OSCE has 
continuously promoted youth education about the Nistru River ecosystem and water 
management. The OSCE’s objective was to make younger generations conscious of their 
shared environmental future and to teach actionable techniques of sustainable development. 
The summer school also functioned as important CBM in itself, by assembling 70 students 
from both conflict parties.  
 The OSCE leads with an example on the environment and enabled, in cooperation 
with the umbrella network Eco-Tiras (representing 50 NGOs), discussions on the 
Dniester/Nistru basin. The organisation hosted a two-day ‘confidence-building measures’ 
conference in late October in Tiraspol, which is already a success in itself, with high numbers 
participating, and being convened eight times in the last decade. The meetings, on actual 
environmental initiatives, have also retained participation from Moldova, Romania, Russia, 
and Ukraine, and with joint activities undertaken by both the left (Transdniestria) and right 
banks of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. 
 From the OSCE’s perspective, inter-state environmental cooperation works well, 
including the project ‘Enabling Transboundary Co-operation and Integrated Water Resources 
Management in the Dniester River Basin’, implemented by the Office of the Co-ordinator of 
OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, assisted by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in 
Ukraine, the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the UNDP/UNECE. The reason behind focusing 
on Transnistria as ‘in-between’ Moldova and Ukraine is, according to Moldova’s Deputy 
                                                             
55 OSCE Mission to Moldova, Press Releases, ‘OSCE Summer School brings together students from both banks 
of Dniester/Nistru river to learn about local ecosystem’ (21 July 2014), http://www.osce.org/moldova/121484; 
‘OSCE supports community-based disaster risk reduction in Moldova’ (2 March 2015), 
http://www.osce.org/moldova/143391; ‘OSCE Mission to Moldova brings together experts from both banks to 
facilitate environmental co-operation’ (11 March 2016), http://www.osce.org/moldova/226886; ‘OSCE and 
UNECE support progress towards climate change adaptation in the Dniester River basin’ (27 March 2017), 
http://www.osce.org/secretariat/307741. 
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Prime Minister of Agriculture, Ion Apostol, the pure functionality that arises from Dniester 
providing drinking water for ‘significant parts of Moldova’s and Ukraine’s population’.56  
 Although initially developed for Moldova-Transnistrian relations, the regional 
dimension of cooperation, including in the EED, also holds potential for the deeper 
involvement of Ukraine. While Ukrainian-Russian relations remain hostile since 2014, a low-
level functional inclusion of Ukraine in this initiative could benefit all parties.57 Little doubt 
exists that business interests have sustained the Transnistrian conflict, and allow Russia an 
additional foothold. As one regional report boldly noted, ‘Taking advantage of the lack of 
vision and [the] corruptibility of Moldovan elites, including at the highest political level, 
Russia has strengthened its influence in Moldova, building economic schemes through which 
the separatist regime in the Transnistrian region was financed including by Moldovans 
money.’58 Furthermore, Moscow has also incentivised a mechanism, by which Transdnistria 
receives free gas and which can be seen as a form of ‘budgetary CBMʼ.59  
 The positive effect of this Moldovan-Ukrainian transboundary cooperation is the 
expansion of conflict resolution tools. Considering that the OSCE’s Liaison Office in 
Tiraspol, Transnistria was closed in the 1990s, convening such a conference in the 
Transnistrian capital is also an achievement.60 The success of location is also evidenced in the 
fact that in 2011, and before the 2012 resumption of the 5+2 negotiating format, a OSCE 
conference on environmental activities with experts and NGOs from both river sides was 
convened in the town of Adul lui Voda. In those unfavourable circumstances, the meeting 
                                                             
56 Ibid. 
57 Telephone interview with Oleksiy Melnyk, Co-Director, Foreign Relations and International Security 
Programmes, Razumkov Centre, 1 July 2017. 
58 Victor Parlicov, Tudor Soitu, Sergiu Tofilat ‘Energy and Politics: The Price for Impunity in 
Moldova’, Policy Paper, The Institute for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS), Viitorul, April 2017, p.6. 
59 Telephone interview with expert, 25 June 2017. 
60 See Maria Raquel Freire, Conflict and Security in the Former Soviet Union: The Role of the OSCE, 2003, 
Routledge ; William H. Hill, Russia, the Near Abroad, and the West: Lessons from the Moldova-Transdniestria 
Conflict (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012); and Tozun Bahcheli, Barry Bartmann, and Henry 
Srebrnik (eds), De facto states: The Quest for Sovereignty (London: Routledge, 2004),. 
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itself could be considered a success. The OSCE Head of Mission Philip Remler stated in 
2011, ‘Environmental issues affect everyone, no matter which side of the river they live on.’61 
The leading German development agency (GIZ) has additionally conducted projects 
on water management. All organisations presented efforts on activities related to the river 
basin, which has proved as an excellent source to support CBMs for both sides to benefit 
conflict resolution.62 Of course, the legal frameworks are issues that need further 
collaboration.’63 The 2016-2018 GIZ project ‘Inter-municipal water management along the 
Dniester’ highlights the importance of securing the Dniester/Nistru as a major drinking water 
reservoir for both regions. GIZ intimates the apolitical, functional benefits of this water 
management initiative that stretches across the conflict divide: ‘The wastewater discharged 
from the dilapidated and inefficient infrastructure on both banks contaminates the river, the 
self-cleaning capacity of which is weakening due to the structure of the riverbed and the poor 
oxygen balance.’ Such common gains are often overlooked in other efforts at conflict 
transformation. Improvements in sanitation and broader inter-municipal cooperation can be 
regarded as highly successful, and with practical results that could follow, and then rightly be 
included in a new narrative of cooperation between the conflict parties.64  
This perspective is confirmed by the aforementioned co-director of the in Kiev-based 
Razumkov Centre, who said that joint cooperation between Moldova and Ukraine, and an 
unrecognised Transnistria is growing, even if conflict transformation requires change in 
Russia’s position.65 Ukrainian-Moldovan cooperation is not an obstacle and even in official 
terms, their mutual interests are complementary. They both seek conflict resolution and also 
                                                             
61 OSCE, ‘OSCE Mission to Moldova promotes environmental co-operation across the Dniestr/Nistru River’, 29 
March 2011, https://www.osce.org/moldova/76243. 
62 OSCE, OSCE and partner organizations launch new project to support implementation of the Dniester River 
Basin Treaty’, 18 December 2017, available at: https://www.osce.org/secretariat/363191. 
63 OSCE, ‘OSCE Mission to Moldova promotes environmental co-operation across the Dniestr/Nistru River’, 29 
March 2011, available at https://www.osce.org/moldova/76243. 
64 GIZ Moldova, ‘Inter-municipal water management along the Dniester River’, 
 https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/42103.html, last accessed 20 June 2018. 
65 Interview with Melynk. 
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wish to continue work with ‘package’ agreements, economic (cross-border) cooperation, and 
deal with issues on self-identification of ethnic minorities.66 Cross-border cooperation is 
illustrated in the above example, which is an important sign for the functioning and 
implementation of the EED. Similarly to Ukraine, Romania as a neighbour to Moldova’s 
West has pressed hard to eto encourage regional integration. This means that cooperation 
exists also here between Moldova and Romania,67 is yet disregarded for the purpose of 
focusing on the Transnistrian conflict. Another example of former cooperation between 
Ukraine and Moldova was the successful mission of the European Union Border Assistance 
Mission to Moldova and Ukraine (EUBAM), established in 2005, which was a pertinent CBM 
forerunner through the measures that arose from ‘customs, trade, transport and trans-boundary 
management’.68 The results of cooperation are potentially considerable and could inspire 
more in the OSCE space. Promoting environmental cooperation fits with EU strategies and 
can be promoted by it more intensively in the OSCE space. Other EED CBMs also exist in the 
vexing conflict that pits Russia and Abkhazia against the West and Georgia. 
 
From Ecological threats to CBM Narratives: Russia, Georgia and Abkhazia 
Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) following its 2008 war with Georgia 
exacerbated relations not only with Georgia but also with the West. Georgia considered the 
Russian-recognised regions to be Occupied Territories under the October 2008 Law of that 
name, while Abkhazia considers itself to be the target of what it sees are ongoing plans for 
war against it by Georgia. Abkhaz officials even claim that Georgian special forces conducted 
                                                             
66 Olena Betlii, Foreign Policy Audit: Ukraine-Moldova, (Kyiv: Institute for World Policy Discussion Paper, 
2016). 
67 Other numerous, regional projects, for example, include this: National policy dialogues on water in Eastern 
Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, OECD http://www.oecd.org/env/outreach/npd-moldova.htm; a regional EU 
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68 EUBAM,’Who we are’, last accessed 8 June 2018, available at: http://eubam.org/who-we-are/. 
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raids across the river that divides the two territories.69 Any developments of positive 
rapprochement between Abkhazia, Georgia and Russia can only be constructive – and yet 
several efforts in the EED have seen possibilities for fruitful cooperation and confidence-
building. The following sections establish how the EED has incentivised CBMs for conflict 
resolution: Fearful Abkhazia needs Georgia’s support to preserve its beautiful but fragile 
ecosystem and subtropical tourist attractions. The scope for, and indeed the fact of unexpected 
regional cooperation among these hardened adversaries confirm the EED’s confidence-
building capacities.  
The Russian search engine Yandex confirmed Abkhazia as the third most popular 
destination for Russian tourists, after Turkey and Cyprus.70 According to UNPO, while the 
participants agree to work on the non-use of force document in the Geneva International 
Discussions (GID), they expressed ‘their willingness to continue searching for solutions to 
humanitarian issues, including environmental safety, preservation of cultural heritage, 
education, and searching for missing persons.’71 Although economic or environmental in the 
context of conflicts is always an indicator of some potential that the conflict might be solved 
in future, literature tells us that in the absence of formal economic cooperation, informal trade 
exchange might still take place on a local, unrecorded scale. Furthermore, it is wise to start 
cooperating from the environmental dimension first as the cause is in everyone’s interest and 
goes beyond the benefit of the individual.  
                                                             
69 This claim has been made by de facto officials on several separate occasions. 
70 ApsnyPress, ‘Abkhazia is among the top three tourist requests on “Yandex”’, 30 June 2017, available at: 
http://apsnypress.info/en/news/abkhazia-is-among-the-top-three-tourist-requests-on-yandex/. One de facto 
Abhkaz official insisted that two million Russians vacation annually in Abkhazia (meeting 25 January 2014). 
Even if the actual numbers are one-tenth, they remain essential for the Abkhaz economy. 
71 UNPO, 23 June 2017, Abkhazia: Georgia Maintains Aggressive Stance towards Abkhazia 
http://unpo.org/article/20158. 
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In May 2016, after being idle for four years the resumption of the Incident Prevention 
and Response Mechanism (IPRM) in Georgia IPRM is a possibility for functional cooperation 
around this ecological imperative. 72 
 
The pests: box tree moth, the brown marmorated stink bug, and palm weevil 
Despite the military-political deadlock and animus, Russia, Abkhazia and Georgia now share 
common enemies in the form of three pests. It is from these that even greater prospects arise 
for the utility of the EED as a CBM in this conflict.  
Brief digression to natural history is essential. The box tree caterpillar and moth was 
largely unknown in Europe (originally deriving from China but became then also common to 
Italy) but Britain’s Royal Horticultural Society has deemed to be the UK’s ‘top pest’ problem 
because of ‘severe defoliation’ in parts of the UK.73 The intensity of threat in the Caucasus is 
far greater, as the pest can only be cured completely from places where the box tree does not 
grew indigenously. The insect threat was visibly demonstrated by its quick defoliation of trees 
in both southern Russia and Abkhazia when they arrived in seedlings imported to spruce up 
the Sochi winter Olympic grounds in 2014.74  
 The box tree moth consumes both hazelnut and citrus fruits, two essential Abkhaz 
crops and therefore of particular concern for Abkhazia; most hazelnut trees are located in 
Eastern Abkhazia, which is the Gali district (a major pastoral area, with little infrastructure 
and after the expulsion of the Georgians only a few have returned unofficially). Under special 
arrangements, however, these Abkhaz-originated hazelnuts are transported to Georgia and 
sold abroad. To underscore the economic risk, Georgia (including Abkhazia) is one of the 
                                                             
72 Civil.ge, ‘Gali IPRM Meetings Resume, After a Break of Four Years’, 28 May 2016.  
73 ‘Box tree caterpillar’, https://www.rhs.org.uk/advice/profile?PID=760, last accessed 25 April 2018; BBC, 
‘Box tree caterpillar tops Royal Horticultural Society pests list’, 18 March 2016., 
74 For a brief account in English, see ‘Abkhazia: boxwoods in danger’, JamNews, 14 September 14 2017, 
available at: https://jam-news.net/?p=58716. 
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world top five-hazelnut exports, and hazelnuts provide 8.5 percent of Georgia’s foreign 
exports.75 90 percent of those are grown in Georgia’s region closest to Abkhazia. 
Understandably the Georgian government responded to the box tree moth threat with alarm, 
and also a willingness to engage in new cooperation.76 
The moth has affected Russia’s Sochi area, Abkhazia, and parts of Georgia and 
Turkey; Georgia has shared its anti-moth experience with Iran,77 and funding from the EU’s 
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument produced a report for the EaP countries, 
assessing forest pests and diseases in native boxwood forests of Georgia.78 The strong focus 
on fighting the environmental pest entails real need and opportunity for cooperation among 
the conflict parties. At the same time, this cooperation is nevertheless political sensitive and 
the activities are kept to a low profile.  
The brown marmorated stink bug, its comical name notwithstanding, provides the 
second threat. It can devour some 300 different plant species, including a wide range of crops, 
but also particularly targets the region’s hazelnuts, and could attack other key crops such as 
citrus, maize and pitted fruits. Apart from its appetite, the bug enjoys extraordinary annual 
reproduction – of a factor of 200. Once settled, it is exponential expansion presents immense 
threat to harvests.  
The palm weevil constitutes the third natural threat. As the name suggests, it attacks, 
palm trees. While an ever-expanded geographic threat, its presence in the Caucasus is 
relatively new and thus presents one area of the world where t infestation be arrested. The 
search for a specific mechanism of irradiation remains, given the lack of consensus on the 
                                                             
75 Devi Dumbadze, ‘Invasive Stink Bug Pest Devastates Georgia’s Agriculture’, Eurasia Daily Monitor Vol. 14, 
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76 Ministry of Agriculture, Georgia, 27 August 2016, http://www.moa.gov.ge/En/News/1172 
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pest’s origins. The Director of the UN’s FAO called it ‘a global threat’, and the EU’s External 
Action Service also expected it to be more of an ecological threat in the European area.79  
In the meantime and regardless of the pests’ origins, Abkhaz authorities have raised 
these ecological threats in the Geneva International Discussions (GID), the sole international 
forum for dealing with the conflicts in Georgia since the 2008 war. In a 2016 GID meeting, 
the Abkhaz recognised the intensity of the problem as having ‘severely defoliate[d] the flora’. 
Governmental experts from Georgia, Abkhazia, Russia, and Turkey and the Czech Republic, 
were brought into two assessment workshops, enabled by the financial and technical support 
and guidance of the OSCE, UN and EU. Anti-pest spraying operations, despite all the 
seeming intractability of this complex conflict, was agreed and implemented. The EU’s 
Special Representative for the South Caucasus Hebert Salber commented on this project in 
2016: ‘This form of rather effective co-operation can hopefully send the signal that a co-
operative approach can also bring about progress in other [conflict] areas’.80  
Similarly, Toivo Klaar, the following EU Special Representative for the South 
Caucasus and the Crisis in Georgia, stated the obvious but essential point that ‘if you have a 
stink bug threatening the crops and if you just address this issue on one side of the ABL and 
you do not do enough on the other side, it will simply come back to you again and again. This 
is no help to the farmers who are working so hard to make a living.’ Such a situation calls for 
‘everyone to be pragmatic enough to make progress on a problem which affects everyone.’81 
Swiss diplomat Gunther Bächler, OSCE Chairman for the GID, went further, even 
observing popular appreciation for solving humanitarian and environmental issues. It can be 
suggested that developing a collaborative programme on agricultural disease-prevention and 
                                                             
79 Based on an interview, 28 June 2017. 
80 ‘Address to the ASRC by Ambassador Herbert Salber European Union Special Representative for the South 
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anti-infestation was a ‘problem-solving exercise’,82 one that could be usefully applied more 
widely to the protracted conflict.  
The potential of these interactions should not be understated, especially as Georgia 
routinely blocked Abkhazia’s mere presence in these forums. Furthermore, Bächler remarked 
on a three-way workshop in Vienna, that despite challenges, the engagement ‘works quite 
well and I think nobody wants to give that up.’83 Unfortunately, successful functional 
cooperation also gives a disquieted party added leverage; Russia used the risk of infestation as 
an excuse to embargo imports of Abkhaz produce, thereby pressuring the vulnerable Abkhaz 
economy, just four days before Georgia made a peace offering to the separatist region in April 
2018.84 
That aside, Abkhazia’s engagement on ecology and environmental issues is based on 
protecting its lucrative tourism and agriculture. This initiative’s success comes from low-
profile cooperation. EU policy makers are confident that it has real potential to grow into a 
regional approach.85  
Although the OSCE is co-sharing (with the UN) the IPRM and the GIDs, the OSCE 
seems absent in projects on the ground,86 which, however, also shows a clear task sharing and 
distribution in Georgia. At the same, the OSCE should be encouraged to do more in the 
Second Dimension, as illustrated by the successful examples given and also demonstrated by 
the following example. According to an EEAS official, there is more space for the OSCE to 
fund follow-up projects. A successful precursor was the grant of $40,000 by the German 
OSCE Chairmanship and implemented by the UNDP, which procured and delivered spraying 
                                                             
82 ‘OSCE Chairman on Geneva Talks & Tskhinvali's “Alania Referendum”’, Georgia Today, 10 April 2017, 
http://georgiatoday.ge/news/6297/OSCE-Chairman-on-Geneva-Talks-%26-Tskhinvali%27s-.  
83 Georgia Today, 10 April 2017. 
84 Civil.ge, ‘Does Tbilisi’s Peace Step have a Future?’, 27 April 2018, available at: 
https://civil.ge/archives/240128. 
85 As indicated above in interviews with international policy-makers. 
86 Interview with the EU, 27 June 2017. It has cooperated via the headquarters for the past three years. 
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equipment to the Abkhaz authorities, and funded an entomological laboratory in the Abkhaz 
capital Sukhum/i.87 
The example of ecological cooperation remains sensitive, as the conflict parties engage in 
cooperation beyond issues and positions that would be counterproductive to their negotiating 
positions in another context. Russia tends to resist Abkhaz-Georgian cooperation but interest 
remains for a broader regional framework to safeguard the (touristic) environment, including 
Abkhaz own interests.88 This is important as these projects also foster Abkhazia’s civil society 
that could also produce more interlocutors for conflict transformation.89 About 60 NGOs are 
registered but only about 20 of them are targeted for such projects, which leaves scope to ask 
about the infrastructure of NGOs including the gender dynamics (given the loss of many 
veterans from the 1992/92 war more women seem to be engaged in NGOs)90. Many NGOs 
are also disadvantaged because they lack sufficient technical skills to know how to engage in 
joint projects. The major EU/UNDP financed Confidence Building Early Response 
Mechanism (COBERM),91 launched in 2010, started the final phase in January 2016 for 
another three years, through which all local needs will be addressed in the scope of specific 
sectoral initiatives across and within communities.92 
                                                             
87 Interview with the EEAS, 28 June 2017. The spelling Sukhum/i is intended for neutrality, the former being the 
Abkhaz spelling, and the full name being the Georgian.  
88 Thomas Ambrosio and William A. Lang, ‘The Architecture of Annexation? Russia’s Bbilateral Agreements 
with South Ossetia and Abkhazia’, Nationalities Papers, Vol. 44 No.5, (2016), pp. 673-93. 
89 Tomáš Hoch, Vincenc Kopeček, and Vladimír Baar, ‘Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in De Facto 
States: The Case of Abkhazia’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 64, No. 6 (July 2016), pp.1-13. 
90 This is a general trend across the erupted conflicts following the Soviet collapse, , Laura Dean, ‘Kennan Cable 
No.26: Women’s Organizations Peacebuilding across Conflicts in the Former Soviet Union’, 11 October 2017, 
available at:  
, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/kennan-cable-no26-womens-organizations-peacebuilding-across-
conflicts-the-former-soviet. 
91 It has allocated a budget of about € 5.5/6 million is targeted at collaborating closely with I/NGOs. 




The EU, still functioning under its 2009/10 engagement but non-recognition policy,93 has 
to ensure that its work through COBERM  does not contribute to much Abkhaz capacity 
building towards growing into a functioning ‘state entity’ (a matter strenuous rejected by 
Georgia and for this reason is very sceptical of all foreign activities in Abkhazia) but 
improves living conditions. One key reason why COBERM has been successful is its 
‘apolitical, impartial and flexible’ project character, the focus being on the promotion of rural 
development, while modernising (vocational) education and even attempting to improve 
border management between Georgia and Azerbaijan.94 In the same source, the UNDP’s 
project map indicates 40 projects but does, however, not indicate projects with Abkhazia (or 
South Ossetia).95 The core EU funding though derives from the ENP, channelled through the 
ENPI with about €17 million allocated to Georgia, which has subcontracted full €8 million 
towards Abkhazia.96  
Such initiatives and also the financial background of it show that CBMs can assist 
conflict transformation. The de facto Abkhaz MFA reported positively through social media 
of the discussion with EUSR Salber in February 2017 on the highly-sensitive issue of border-
crossings to Georgia. Those discussions also included ‘environmental issues of regional 
security’, specifically the insect plague. The EUSR commented that ‘the meeting was held in 
a warm and friendly atmosphere.’97 While much larger issues remain unresolved in the 
Abkhaz-Georgian conflict, and all that this conflict tinderbox adds to Russian tensions with 
                                                             
93 Sabine Fischer, How to Engage with Abkhazia? (Brussels: European Union Institute for Security Studies, 
November, 2010); Alexander Frolov, ‘Abkhazia: A Zone of Alienation or a Zone of Growth?’, International 
Affairs: A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations, Vol 62, No. 5 (2016), 
pp.179-190. 
94 ‘Project Map’, http://www.ge.undp.org/content/georgia/en/home/operations/projects/map.html 
95 Ibid. 
96 Interview with the EU, over €15 billion funding has been granted to the period 2014-2020, with 95 per cent 
foreseen for national and multi-country programmes and 5 per cent for cross-border cooperation programmes.  
97 MFA Abkhazia, 16 February 2017, Facebook, 
https://www.facebook.com/MFAofAbkhazia/posts/1208429479264650:0 
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the West; the pest infestation has still provided for CBMs and also positive dimensions to the 
otherwise dichotomised narratives that continue to divide the conflict parties. 
 
Conclusion 
The EED is considered not only an integral part of the OSCE’s comprehensive security but 
also a means of confidence building in its own right. Western-Russian relations are inarguably 
poor, and measures that can ease some of those tensions should be welcomed. That goes 
particularly in post-Soviet conflict zones, such as Transnistria-Moldova and Abkhazia-
Georgia, where the Kremlin often presents Russian interests in moral terms, yet add to larger 
geopolitical tensions. Indeed, Western-Russian interests have collided in these protracted 
conflicts. 
This article contends that the previous and current history of the EED offers some 
means forward. That requires having Western and post-communist governments to be more 
forceful in their own commitment to the EED. Post-Soviet states, however, are generally 
stronger rhetoric supporters of the EED than Western states; this support can be used 
tochannel, shape and encourage the potential of the EED more visibly. 
Thus, pSs should recognise that the EED’s confidence-building capacity cannot have 
significance without that OSCE dimension itself gaining more prominence. PSs often accord 
the EED still scant attention and should increase the prominence of the EED in their own 
MFA and Mission explanations, as well as in statements for example to the OSCE’s 
Permanent Council. OSCE institutions and affiliated structures, such as the OSCE 
Parliamentary Assembly, could do likewise. Euro-Atlantic governments could update and 
expand their webpages per se, and also give fuller attention to the EED, even before 
considering its CBM potential. As much as field missions are highly politicised in the OSCE, 
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mandates continue to support EED activities, very possibly because they are seen as 
apolitical, win-win. By retaining and expanded the EED dimension, the OSCE can also retain 
its human dimension activities, if only, at the worst, to be a source of protection and support 
for civil society activists and human dimension defenders.  
Coordinated work with other IOs would be essential to maximise results and minimise 
overlap and competition. Western governments (despite poor public dissemination) support 
the EED and in its field missions; they could explore further the use of non-budgetary funds 
for EED projects. National funding is brandable as such if relevant to the domestic 
constituencies of donor governments, and the credit thus not being lost in a pool of collective 
aid. These initiatives could include support for project-based initiatives in existing field 
missions/project coordination offices; and linking more intensively anti-terrorism initiatives, 
for which enormous rhetorical support exists, to economic initiative, such as anti-money 
laundering. Indeed our expectation, including based on a number of informal discussions, is 
that EED activity does occur and may generate greater confidence between parties The 
OSCE’s various media tools can then be mobilised to acknowledge and disseminate positive 
examples. The OSCE Academy’s Masters programme in Economic Governance and 
Development, which brings together graduate student from across Central Asia an 
Afghanistan (occasional additional countries) could be expanded.98  
And perhaps most significantly, the EU expressly ties contents of its AAs and 
DCFTAs with Georgia and Moldova to aspects of the conflicts, and seeing its overriding 
ambitions of reform as helping to address the conflict dynamic. Thus the AA writes that 
‘strengthening democracy and market economy will facilitate participation of Georgia [and 
separately and similarly with Moldova] in EU policies, programmes and agencies.’ Those 
reforms, in turn, with conflict resolution efforts ‘will  mutually reinforce each other and will 
                                                             
98 See http://www.osce-academy.net/en/masters/edg/.  
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contribute to build confidence between communities divided by conflict’.99 That confidence 
can come from, for example, the EU’s permissiveness to the sale of Abkhaz agriculture in 
Georgian exports. The EU routinely supports OSCE conflict resolution efforts; further 
mobilisation of EU capacities in the EED could be highly significant. 
Almost counterintuitively, the article has identified EED areas of activity in two 
protracted post-Soviet conflicts where cooperation has occurred. That in turn, may help to 
change the rigid and threatening narratives each side has of the other, and which have 
consequently ensured that the conflicts themselves unresolved. Perhaps a long shot, but these 
EED potentialities might even assist to improve Russian-Western relations. The cooperation 
regarding the Nistru/Dniester river basin has shown cooperation not only between the two 
riversides but also between Moldova and Ukraine, which is very important in light of Russia’s 
financial influence by means of Transnistria’s gas debt as indicated earlier. In the South 
Caucasus, a similar phenomenon – here not the safeguarding of water as a resource but the 
protection of the forestation and flora – justified the cooperation of three parties that cannot 
agree with each other. In the context of the environment, they could. The latter example 
demonstrated how complementary the OSCE’s role served the EU and UN capacity on the 
ground. The OSCE remains the key driver in the efforts that are jointly with the German 
development agency GIZ, the UNDP and other local foreign-financed NGOs (the role of the 
EU did not seem notable looking at the coordination between the major IOs with regard to 
water management as the EU seems to focus more on SMEs and the health sector; 
coordination is natural and necessary).  
                                                             
99 See the Preamble, in In Agreements Council Decision of  16  June  2014 on  the  signing,  on  behalf  of  
the  European  Union,  and  provisional  application  of  the  Association  Agreement  between  the  
European  Union  and  the  European  Atomic  Energy  Community  and  their  Member  States,  of  the  one  





In view of the unexpected or overlooked EED CBM identified in this article, it further 
recommends that the OSCE should continue to seek and support low-political or apolitical 
EED projects in in conflict zones. The Organization is inclined to cooperate with other IOs 
and IFIs and the EU has particularly undertaken small-scale initiatives to assist in 
unrecognised or partially recognised post-Soviet states but without thereby implying, let alone 
effectively granting recognition.100 The OSCE knows well the exclusivist national narratives 
told by each conflict party, but can integrate current cases of functional cooperation to rebuild 
aspects of Soviet-era trust and cooperation. Abkhazia-Georgian relations have benefitted from 
the necessary cooperation around the Soviet-era Inguri dam, which has supplied electricity to 
both conflict parties, even during very tense periods. That textbook case of functional 
cooperation, however, did not, to use functionalist peace-building language, ‘spillover’ into 
other sectors. Agricultural cooperation may now be that achingly-needed new sector. 
The strength and weakness of the OSCE is that is has had all of its disparate 
participating States sign up to normative values, but on political rather than a binding-legal 
basis. The EED is an integral part of the OSCE comprehensive security. The EED does 
feature, albeit unduly quietly, in positive ways, including in confidence-building. Considering 
the poor state of relations among post-Soviet entities, and those, foremost Russia, in turn with 
the West, the EED presents no losses or risks, and much potential. That ready opportunity can 
and should be seized. 
                                                             
100 Of the relatively few analysts of EED potential divergent opinions exist on how well the OSCE works 
with other IOs. On one hand, particularly in Central Asia, it has been noted that ‘the OSCE is working in 
areas that other organisations often know better’ and ‘the OSCE can never match’ their resourcing. On the 
other hand, the concern has long-existed that the OSCE has been pushed towards development projects, 
an activity that is not its main focus.  For the former see, Warkotsch, ‘OSCE as an agent’, p. 836; the latter, 
Evers, ‘Building Co-operation’, p. 5. Fawn, International Organizations, suggests a way forward in the 
conclusion. 
